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INTRODUCTION
When the state uses its position as an employer to regulate the
speech of public employees,' First Amendment questions arise that
are more complicated than those typically posed in cases involving
freedom of speech.2 In employee speech cases, the state and indi-
vidual both play dual roles. The state is at once the sovereign and
the employer; the individual, a citizen and an employee. The pres-
ence of an employment relationship provides the state with greater
incentive and greater ability to restrict an individual's speech. The
state's increased incentive to restrict speech is rooted in efficiency
concerns: like all employers, the state needs to manage its opera-
tions efficiently, and efficient management requires some control
over employee speech.3 The state's increased ability to restrict
speech arises from the availability of employment-related sanc-
tions: as sovereign, the state restricts speech through injunctions,4
t B.S. 1986, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 1990, The University of
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I The term "public employees" is used in this Comment to denote non-civil service
employees at the federal, state, and local levels. Civil servants, who are hired based on com-
petitive examinations under an established civil service system, are subject to special speech
regulations beyond the scope of this Comment. See, for example, The Hatch Political Activ-
ity Act, 5 USC § 7324 (1982). On the other hand, civil servants receive certain statutory
rights not accorded public employees. See, for example, The Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 5 USC §
7513 (1982) (civil servant may not be fired without "cause").
2 "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;...
US Const, Amend I. These prohibitions were extended to the states through the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fiske v Kansas, 274 US 380 (1927).
3 Although the speech of ordinary citizens may also disrupt government efficiency (see
Greer v Spock, 424 US 828, 836 (1976)), public employee speech poses a much greater threat
to government operations. Public employees have greater access to inside information about
the government and spend more time at government facilities. In addition, statements of
employees will be given greater credence by the public than statements of non-employees
(indeed, the speech of an employee might even appear to the public to be the speech of the
government office for which the employee works), and may erode vital public support.
See, for example, Pittsburgh Press Co. v Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela-
tions, 413 US 376 (1973) (newspaper prohibited from carrying "help-wanted" advertise-
ments in sex-designated columns).
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damages,5 and criminal penalties,6 but as employer it may circum-
vent the judicial process and sanction public employees directly
with either disciplinary action or dismissal.
Until the 1950s, the Supreme Court had held that when the
state disciplines or dismisses public employees for their speech it
acts just like a private employer, and hence is not subject to the
restrictions that the First Amendment places upon its acts as sov-
ereign.7 During the 1950s and 1960s, the Court gradually acknowl-
edged constitutional claims by public employees.' And, in 1967, the
Supreme Court recognized in Pickering v Board of Education9 that
employment-imposed restrictions on employee speech may violate
the First Amendment. This Comment contends, however, that the
treatment of employee speech set forth in Pickering and its prog-
eny still permits the state to unduly restrict the free speech rights
of public employees.
This Comment begins with a review of the major Supreme
Court decisions in the area. It then illustrates the difficulties en-
gendered by these decisions, particularly the problems arising from
the so-called "public concern" threshold test. The Comment then
proposes a new structure for First Amendment analysis of public
employee speech. The structure features a new threshold test that
would afford standard First Amendment protection to all employee
speech except speech that is "related" to employment. Speech suf-
ficiently related to employment to merit attention from the state
as employer would be subject to a new sequence of burdens of
proof, designed to better respect the reasons for regulating-and,
in some cases, for tolerating-disruptive employee speech.
See, for example, Dun & Bradstreet v Greenmoss Builders, 472 US 749, 756-57 (1985)
(compensatory and punitive damages awarded in defamation action).
6 See, for example, New York v Ferber, 458 US 747 (1982) (bookstore owner found
guilty of felony for selling material depicting "sexual performance" by minors).
' Justice Holmes's famous aphorism, written while he was serving on the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, aptly characterizes this view: "The petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v
Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass 216, 29 NE 517, 517 (1892).
s See Wieman v Updegraif, 344 US 183 (1952) (invalidating on due process grounds an
Oklahoma statute requiring state employees to take a loyalty oath). See also Keyishian v
Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 605 (1967) (rejecting the notion that public employment
"may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be
abridged by direct government action").
9 391 US 563 (1968).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF FREE SPEECH RIGHTS FOR PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES
In the leading case of Pickering v Board of Education, public
schoolteacher Marvin Pickering was fired for a letter he had writ-
ten to the editor of the local newspaper; the letter criticized the
school board for its handling of revenue proposals and for its allo-
cation of funds between the school's academic and athletic pro-
grams. Pickering sued for reinstatement, claiming First Amend-
ment protection.
The Supreme Court recognized the case as an opportunity to
establish the broad parameters of a constitutional standard for
state regulation of public employee speech. Two extreme ap-
proaches presented themselves. At one end was the Illinois courts'
holding that public schoolteachers relinquish their First Amend-
ment rights when they accept employment; an individual has no
right to be a teacher, the courts reasoned, and accepts the privilege
of employment subject to the conditions specified by government."0
At the other extreme was the view that public employees should
enjoy the same latitude in speech rights as ordinary citizens.
The Court rejected both views, recognizing that one unneces-
sarily abridged the First Amendment rights of public employees,
while the other failed to acknowledge the state's increased interest
in regulating the speech of its employees.1" Instead, the Court
surmised that the state possesses an interest as employer in limit-
ing the speech of its employees that is not insuperable, but that is
10 See Pickering v Board of Education, 36 Ill 2d 568, 225 NE2d 1, 6 (1967) ("[Plaintiff]
is no more entitled to harm the schools by speech than by incompetency, cruelty, negligence,
[or] immorality.... By choosing to teach in the public schools, Plaintiff undertook the
obligation to refrain from conduct which in the absence of such a position he would have an
undoubted right to engage in."). The Illinois courts were following the traditional view, dis-
cussed in note 7 and accompanying text. In Pickering, the Supreme Court said that the
rights-privilege distinction underlying this view had been "unequivocally rejected" in prior
decisions. Pickering, 391 US at 568, citing: Wieman, 344 US 183; Shelton v Tucker, 364 US
479 (1960); and Keyishian, 385 US 589. For a discussion of these and other cases, see Case-
note, Infringement upon Public Employees' Right to Speak on Matters of Public Concern,
55 Tenn L Rev 175, 178-83 (1987).
11 Pickering, 391 US at 568. For another view, see Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4, 67-73 (1988):
[A] court can simply ask whether the kinds of restrictions that the government seeks to
impose on its own employees are similar to those that private firms in competitive
labor markets impose on employees engaged in similar activities. Perhaps some posi-
tions in government are so unique that no private analysis applies, but even in this
context, the large number of government employees may help create a competitive la-
bor market.
Id at 68.
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greater than its interest as sovereign in limiting the speech of its
citzens." The goal, the Court wrote, must be to "arrive at a bal-
ance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in com-
menting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public ser-
vices it performs through its employees."' 13 The result has been
called "Pickering balancing," which permits restriction of em-
ployee speech less valuable than the disruption it causes.
The Court implicitly adopted a broad definition of disruption
in Pickering. An employee's speech disrupts the efficiency of a
public employer when it: (1) adversely affects the employee's own
performance; (2) disturbs harmony and discipline in the workplace;
(3) interferes with the regular operation of the government office or
agency; or (4) undermines public trust in the office or agency by
disseminating false information in such a way that renders the gov-
ernment employer unable to effectively counter the employee's
speech.' 4 A broad definition of disruption enables the government
employer to restrict employee speech that directly impairs govern-
ment efficiency (by, for example, interrupting the normal office
routine or distracting government workers) as well as speech that
reveals the employee's own incompetence,' 5 creates "disharmony"
among other workers,' 6 or demonstrates disloyalty.17
Even this broad definition of disruption, however, protects
employee speech that does not affect the employer in any way. In-
deed, in Pickering itself the Court found that the teacher's speech
12 Pickering, 391 US at 568.
1 Id.
14 Id at 569-73. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 Cal
L Rev 889, 919 (1986): "In its capacity as employer, the government has two interests that
come up in many contexts: the desire to avoid disruption of working relationships and the
need to set out a uniform official position." Professor Sunstein also points out that the gov-
ernment has an "institutional interest in exaggerating the extent to which speech that is
critical of current policies, or that discloses information, interferes with the employment
relationship." Id.
1 See Lefcourt v Legal Aid Society, 445 F2d 1150, 1153 (2d Cir 1971) ("Lefcourt's right
to freedom of speech did not preclude [his employer] from concluding on the basis of Lef-
court's views that he was unable or unwilling to implement various policies of the
[employer].").
16 See Phillips v Adult Probation Dept., 491 F2d 951, 955 (9th Cir 1974) (probation
officer did not have a First Amendment right to display a poster on his office wall depicting
fugitives from justice in a favorable light, since it "would impair the efficiency of the De-
partment through dissension and disharmony among the employees.").
7 See Sprague v Fitzpatrick, 546 F2d 560, 565 (3d Cir 1976) (Assistant District Attor-
ney who was fired after demanding the resignation of the District Attorney could not be
reinstated because there had been an "irreparable breach of confidence" between the supe-
rior and the employee).
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was not disruptive at all, and concluded that when an employee's
speech does not disrupt government efficiency, it should be evalu-
ated under normal First Amendment standards; that is, the em-
ployee should be treated as though he were speaking as an ordi-
nary citizen. 8 The Court observed that if an ordinary citizen had
written the letter at issue in Pickering, it would have been judged
under the First Amendment standards for libel. Consequently, the
state could not dismiss Pickering from public employment "absent
proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him."' 9
The Supreme Court did not have occasion to apply Pickering
balancing until fifteen years later, in Connick v Myers.20 In Con-
nick, New Orleans District Attorney Sheila Myers prepared and
circulated within the office a questionnaire soliciting the views of
fellow employees concerning, among other things, office transfer
policy, the need for a grievance committee, and the level of confi-
dence in supervisors. The circulation of the questionnaire followed
failed attempts to convince the District Attorney, Harry Connick,
to revoke his plan to transfer her to a different office. Connick con-
sidered the questionnaire an act of insubordination and fired My-
ers. Myers sued, alleging that she was improperly discharged for
speaking as a citizen. The lower courts agreed. But the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the lower courts had "misapplied"
Pickering.2'
18 Pickering, 391 US at 572-73. The Court's conclusion meant that "Pickering balanc-
ing" was formulated but never actually applied in Pickering itself; later Supreme Court
cases would have to show how balancing would be done. See the discussion in text at note 20
of Connick v Myers, 461 US 138 (1983).
" Pickering, 391 US at 574. Because Pickering criticized public officials, the Court ap-
plied the New York Times standard. See New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254
(1964). The Court declined to adduce different constitutional standards for different state
sanctions:
While criminal sanctions and damage awards have a somewhat different impact on the
exercise of the right to freedom of speech from dismissal from employment, it is appar-
ent that the threat of dismissal from public employment is nonetheless a potent means
of inhibiting speech.
Pickering, 391 US at 574.
20 461 US 138 (1983). In the interim, three cases allowed the Court to define the limits
of Pickering without explicitly balancing. In Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593, 596-98
(1972), the Court ruled that the First Amendment protects public employees even absent
tenure or a contractual right to reemployment. In Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v
Doyle, 429 US 274, 285 (1977), the Court held that a public employer may justify discipli-
nary action against an employee by showing that the action would have been taken even in
the absence of the protected speech. And in Givhan v Western Line Consolidated School
District, 439 US 410, 414 (1979), the Court held that an employee does not forfeit "protec-
tion against governmental abridgement of freedom of speech if [she] decides to express [her]
views privately rather than publicly."
21 Connick, 461 US at 142.
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The Court explained that Pickering balancing is to be pre-
ceded by a threshold test implicit in Pickering itself: if an em-
ployee's speech "cannot be fairly characterized as constituting
speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for [the
Court] to scrutinize the reasons for [the employee's] discharge."22
The Court proceeded to examine the questionnaire for matters of
public concern, finding that only one of Myers's fourteen ques-
tions-regarding pressure to work on political campaigns-passed
this threshold and merited Pickering balancing. In applying Pick-
ering balancing to that question, the Court found that although
Myers's ability to perform her own duties had not been impaired,23
her actions may have impaired the efficiency of the office. 24
Connick, then, added to Pickering a "public concern" thresh-
old test designed to distinguish speech that will be subjected to a
balancing of interests from speech that will be treated as if the
government were a private employer and not subject to First
Amendment restrictions at all. As a threshold, it is intended to re-
duce the number of employment decisions generating constitu-
tional challenges,25 while preserving the First Amendment's protec-
tion of worthy public employee speech.
The only free speech case involving a public employee decided
by the Supreme Court since Connick is Rankin v McPherson.2 6
McPherson was a clerical employee working in a constable's office.
After hearing of an assassination attempt on President Reagan's
life, McPherson remarked to a fellow employee, "If they go for him
again, I hope they get him." A third worker overheard the remark
and reported it to the constable, Rankin; Rankin called McPherson
into his office and fired her when she confessed to the remark. The
Rankin Court found that McPherson's remark "plainly dealt with
a matter of public concern" because "[iut came on the heels of a
news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of heightened
22 Id at 146.
2. Id at 151.
2 The Court explained that:
Here the questionnaire was prepared and distributed at the office; the manner of distri-
bution required not only Myers to leave her work but others to do the same in order
that the questionnaire be completed. Although some latitude in when official work is
performed is to be allowed when professional employees are involved, and Myers did
not violate announced office policy, the fact that Myers, unlike Pickering, exercised her
rights to speech at the office supports Connick's fears that the functioning of his office
was endangered.
Id at 153.
25 Id at 143.
26 483 US 378, 107 S Ct 2891 (1987).
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public attention: an attempt on the life of the President."2 Having
determined that McPherson's speech addressed a matter of public
concern, the Court performed the requisite balancing and was "not
persuaded that Rankin's interest in discharging [Myers] out-
weighed her rights under the First Amendment."2
The importance of Rankin lies in its extension of the Picker-
ing/Connick regime beyond speech critical of the employer. In
Pickering, the Court had purported to adopt a balancing test for
"the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical state-
ments by teachers and other public employees may be thought by
their supervisors, against whom the statements are directed, to fur-
nish grounds for dismissal."29 Connick claimed only to clarify the
balancing test's threshold. Rankin, however, applied Pickering bal-
ancing and the Connick public concern threshold to speech unre-
lated to criticism of the employee's supervisor or ultimate em-
ployer.30 The result is that the PickeringlConnick test for deciding
public employee free speech cases now applies to a broad spectrum
of public employee speech.
II. THE BABY AND THE BATH WATER: FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES UNDER THE PUBLIC CONCERN THRESHOLD TEST
The Connick Court justified its adoption of a threshold test on
the perceived need to keep frivolous claims from paralyzing the
state's employment decisions. The Court cited the "common-sense
realization that government offices could not function if every em-
ployment decision became a constitutional matter."31 Although the
Connick Court's concern about Pickering's allocation of burdens is
well-founded, it does not compel a threshold based on public con-
cern. A threshold test could take many forms, and public concern
is only one variation. The selection of a threshold test should de-
pend not only on whether the test preserves judicial re-
17 Id at 2897-98.
28 Id at 2900.
11 Pickering, 391 US at 569 (emphasis added).
3o Rankin was the first case to extend the application of Pickering in this way. See
Perry, 408 US at 595 (Sindermann was not offered a contract renewal, allegedly because of
his public criticism of a college administration); Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 282 (the release of
an internal memo on the school's dress and appearance code for teachers was construed as
"criticism" of the administration); Givhan, 439 US at 412-13 (Givhan criticized a School
District's practices and policies, which she considered racially discriminatory); and Connick,
461 US at 141 (Myers distributed a questionnaire soliciting criticism of the district attorney
from other assistant district attorneys).
3 Connick, 461 US at 143.
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sources-many threshold tests could accomplish that goal-but on
whether the test properly selects cases in which the individual
should be subject to the unique First Amendment balancing ap-
plied to public employees. The public concern threshold, however,
defies the intuitions that inspired Pickering balancing.
A. Precedential Basis of the "Public Concern" Test
The Connick Court introduced the public concern threshold
test as but another step in the "historical evolvement of the rights
of public employees. '32 It cited, as prior steps in this evolution, a
line of cases from the 1950s and 1960s (identified as "the precedent
in which Pickering is rooted"),33 and three cases that the Supreme
Court had decided since Pickering.34 Each of these cases, the Court
observed, involved speech on matters of public concern. But the
fact that these previous cases had involved speech of public con-
cern was not reason, in itself, to limit constitutional protections to
speech of public concern. The Court had rejected just this kind of
inductive reasoning in a related case, when it brushed aside the
argument that employee speech made privately should receive no
constitutional protection just because all prior employee speech
cases had involved speech made publicly. The Court wrote:
The Court's [precedents] do not support the conclusion that a
public employee forfeits his protection against governmental
abridgement of freedom of speech if he decides to express his
views privately rather than publicly. While those cases each
arose in the context of a public employee's public expression,
the rule to be derived from them is not dependent on that
largely coincidental fact.3 5
In reality, neither the courts nor the parties in any of the cases
cited in Connick had contended that the speech was not of public
concern. The Supreme Court had simply not yet decided a case in
which the significance of public concern was placed in issue.
32 Id.
11 Id at 144. See, for example, Wieman v Updegraff, 344 US 183 (1952) (prohibiting the
state from requiring employees to swear an oath denying past affiliation with Communists);
Cafeteria Workers v McElroy, 367 US 886 (1961) (prohibiting the state from using previous
membership in certain political parties as a basis for denying employment); and Keyishian v
Board of Regents, 385 US 589 (1967) (prohibiting the state from denying government em-
ployment to members of "subversive" organizations).
, See Perry, 408 US 593; Mt. Healthy, 429 US 274; and Givhan, 439 US 410. These
cases are discussed in more detail in notes 20 and 30.
11 Givhan, 439 US at 414.
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The Connick Court's discovery of a threshold test implicit in
Pickering is also misplaced. Under Pickering, "public concern" was
merely one of several factors to be considered in the balancing of
interests."6 Moreover, the burden of proof was assigned in Picker-
ing such that a court would only consider "public concern" once
the government had proved disruption.3 7 If the government failed
to show that a statement disrupted the workings of government,
the speech would be protected.3 8
Finally, the trend of the Court's decisions in the area was
quite the opposite of what Connick suggested. Since the 1950s, the
Court had steadily expanded the free speech rights of public em-
ployees.39 Connick constricted these rights by withdrawing protec-
tion from all speech not deemed of public concern.4 °
B. The Many Faces of Public Concern in the Lower Courts
Despite the fact that precedent does not compel the public
concern threshold, the choice of "public concern" as the line be-
tween protected and unprotected speech is not arbitrary. A major
3' See Recent Decisions, Constitutional Law: Balancing Test Applied to Teacher's
Criticism of School Board, 35 Brooklyn L Rev 270, 273-74 (1969).
31 Pickering implicitly creates a three-part burden of proof scheme. First, the employee
must prove a causal link between the employee's speech and the employer's retaliation (i.e.,
termination, failure to give a promotion, etc.). Second, if the employee meets this initial
burden, the employer must show that the speech impeded the employee's performance or
otherwise interfered with the efficient operations of government. If the employer meets that
burden, the court balances the interests of the employer against the interests of the em-
ployee. See Note, The Nonpartisan Freedom of Expression of Public Employees, 76 Mich L
Rev 365, 369-70 (1977).
38 See Note, Connick v. Myers: New Restrictions on the Free Speech Rights of Govern-
ment Employees, 60 Ind L J 339, 354 (1985):
The [Pickering] Court's reasoning [ ] leads unmistakably to the conclusion that Picker-
ing's status as a teacher at the high school would militate against his right to criticize
the school administration only if his conduct impeded the operations of the school sys-
tem. There is no suggestion in the Pickering opinion that a public employee who
wishes to discuss a matter not of general interest must do so at his own risk. Denying a
discharged public employee an opportunity to demonstrate that his speech affected
neither his own performance nor the operations of the agency because his expression is
not of public concern, as the Connick decision does, is a drastic and dangerous exten-
sion of the Pickering rationale.
- For an excellent description of the expansion of free speech for public employees
from Pickering to Connick, see Comment, The Public Employee's Right of Free Speech: A
Proposal for a Fresh Start, 55 U Cin L Rev 449, 450-64 (1986).
40 Prior to Connick, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits had assumed that public concern
was a prerequisite to First Amendment protection. See Gieringer v Center School Dist. No.
58, 477 F2d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir 1973); and Bernasconi v Tempe Elementary School Dist.
No. 3, 548 F2d 857, 861 (9th Cir 1977) (quoting district court opinion). Two circuit court
opinions hardly constitutes a trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence, however.
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purpose of the First Amendment was to "protect the free discus-
sion of governmental affairs."'41 The Connick Court, drawing on
this tradition, used the concept of public concern to distinguish
cases in which the courts would interfere with a public employ-
ment relationship from cases in which the courts would defer to
the public employer's decision. So characterized, the public con-
cern threshold can be supported: it provides limited First Amend-
ment protection (in the form of Pickering balancing) to the most
important forms of expression while allowing the state's efficiency
interests to trump less important types of expression. Stated an-
other way, the public concern test is designed to determine
whether an employee's speech "takes on significance outside the
workplace or whether it deals primarily with an employee's per-
sonal employment problem. '42 Nevertheless, the test is problem-
atic and vague, and unnecessarily abridges the free speech rights of
public employees.
The most fundamental problem with the public concern
threshold test has emerged from attempts to apply it: no one
knows what "public concern" is. Connick defined "public concern"
as "any matter of political, social, or other concern to the commu-
nity"43 in light of "the content, form, and context of a given state-
ment, as revealed by the whole record. '44 More specifically, the
Court noted that "mere extensions of [a personnel] dispute"4 are
not of public concern. On the other hand, the Court explained that
public concern included statements: (1) "of public import in evalu-
ating the performance of ... an elected official"; (2) "seek[ing] to
inform the public that the [government office or agency] was not
discharging its governmental responsibilities"; and (3) "seek[ing]
to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of the
public trust on the part of [a government official]."46
These descriptions of public concern provided just enough
guidance to confuse everyone. As Justice Brennan predicted in his
Connick dissent,47 the concept eluded consistent definition as the
41 Mills v Alabama, 384 US 214, 218 (1966).
42 Flanagan v Munger, 890 F2d 1557, 1564 (10th Cir 1989).
" Connick, 461 US at 146.
4 Id at 147-48.
45 Id at 148.
46 Id.
41 Justice Brennan wrote:
The Court recognized the sensitive nature of [determining public concern] in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), which held that the scope of the constitutional
privilege in defamation cases turns on whether or not the plaintiff is a public figure,
not on whether the statements at issue address a subject of public concern. In so doing,
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lower courts developed their own "public concern" jurisprudence.
Many circuit courts condition their protection of public employee
speech on whether the speech will help the public evaluate the per-
formance of government.4" This narrow conception of the threshold
test, however, excludes from First Amendment protection artistic,
commercial, and other speech that is normally protected. More-
over, this approach merely replaces the indeterminate "public con-
cern" with the indeterminate "useful."
Other courts have focused on the speaker's intent. The Sev-
enth Circuit has reasoned that the Connick test "requires us to
look at the point of the speech in question: was it the employee's
point.., to raise other issues of public concern because they are of
public concern ... [or] to further some purely private interest?" 9
But focusing on the speaker's intent fails to protect speech in
which an employee inadvertently touches on a matter of public
concern or purposefully avoids making the speech public out of
concern for the person criticized.5
the Court referred to the "difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an
ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and which
do not," and expressed "doubt [about] the wisdom of committing this task to the con-
science of the judges."
Id at 164 (Brennan dissenting).
8 See, for example, McKinley v City of Eloy, 705 F2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir 1983). This
standard has its roots in Connick's observation that courts should consider whether state-
ments "are of public import in evaluating the performance of... an elected official." 461 US
at 148. That language is too narrow, however, because many public employee cases involve
behavior by an unelected official.
The Tenth Circuit has distinguished the subject matter of the speech from the actual
content of the speech. In Koch v City of Hutchinson, for example, a fire marshall's report on
a fire that killed a small child was held not to be of public concern, even though the investi-
gation of the fire itself was "a matter of great public concern." Since the report was a rou-
tine part of the marshall's duties, it did not "sufficiently inform the issue as to be helpful to
the public in evaluating the conduct of government." 847 F2d 1436, 1447 (10th Cir 1987)
(citations omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit has also emphasized the usefulness of the speech to the public. In
Ferrara v Mills, 781 F2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir 1986), the court followed Justice Brennan's
admonition that "[t]he First Amendment affords special protection to speech that may in-
form public debate about how our society is to be governed-regardless of whether it actu-
ally becomes the subject of a public controversy." (emphasis in original) (quoting Connick,
461 US at 160 (Brennan dissenting)).
11 Linhart v Glatfelter, 771 F2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir 1985). Along with the Seventh
Circuit, other circuits that have examined motive to determine public concern include the
Fifth Circuit (Gomez v Texas Dept. of Mental Health, 794 F2d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir 1986));
the Tenth Circuit (Koch v City of Hutchinson, 847 F2d 1436, 1445-46 (10th Cir 1987)); and
the Eleventh Circuit (Morales v Stierheim, 848 F2d 1145, 1149 (11th Cir 1988)).
" See, for example, Callaway v Hafeman, 832 F2d 414 (7th Cir 1987). Franzetta Cal-
laway, a school district employee, complained of sexual harassment by her supervisor. The
supervisor later gave Callaway a negative performance evaluation, after which Callaway was
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In determining whether speech is of public concern, the
Eighth Circuit has inquired whether actual public debate occurred
on the matter.5 1 This standard, however, does not adequately pro-
tect two types of speech expressly provided for in Connick: speech
"seek[ing] to inform the public that the [government office or
agency] was not discharging its governmental responsibilities,"52
and speech "seek[ing] to bring to light actual or potential wrong-
doing or breach of the public trust on the part of [a government
official] . ' 3s There is a certain perversity in permitting the state to
punish an employee who attempts to disclose wrongdoing merely
because that wrongdoing has not yet been publicly debated.
The Fifth Circuit has attempted to divine matters of public
concern through standards applied to the "the content, form, and
context of a given statement. '54 The result is a laundry list of rele-
vant considerations: (1) whether the communication relates to the
policies of the institution or to the actions of other employees;55 (2)
whether the communication is in-house;56 (3) whether the em-
transferred to a position that was considered a demotion. The Court held that Callaway's
speech was not protected under the intent inquiry:
Prior to the commencement of this litigation, Callaway limited her complaints of sex-
ual harassment to oral statements intended to be purely confidential. As Callaway ex-
plained in a meeting with several of the defendants, she wanted her grievance to be
resolved internally to avoid a public controversy .... While the content of Callaway's
communications touched upon an issue of public concern generally, she was not at-
tempting to speak out as a citizen concerned with problems facing the school district;
instead, she spoke as an employee attempting to resolve her private dilemma.
Id at 417.
The Callaway case shows that an employee who conscientiously attempts to resolve a
dispute within the office may not be protected. Had Callaway gone to the public, possibly an
irresponsible and rash act, she would have been rewarded with First Amendment protection.
The creation of such perverse incentives probably outweighs any gains in determinacy that
the intent inquiry might achieve.
51 See Lewis v Harrison School Dist. No. 1, 805 F2d 310 (8th Cir 1986); and Patteson v
Johnson, 721 F2d 228, 233 (8th Cir 1983). The Eight Circuit has considered other factors
besides "actual public debate," however. See Southside Pub. Schools v Hill, 827 F2d 270,
273 (8th Cir 1987) (inquiring whether the grievance related merely to a private employment
matter or personal vendetta); and Hamer v Brown, 831 F2d 1398, 1402 (8th Cir 1987) (citing
Connick and holding that speech was of public concern because it related to a matter of
"political, social, or other concern to the community.").
52 Connick, 461 US at 148.
53 Id.
54 Id at 147-48.
55 See Davis v West Community Hospital, 755 F2d 455, 461 (5th Cir 1985) (A person
speaks as an employee when the speech relates solely to the person's employment. State-
ments are not of public concern, therefore, if they do "not involve any policy or practice of
the [government agency]; and they are related only to isolated, unsubstantiated acts by spe-
cific individuals.").
56 See id ("The fact.., that the communications here were inhouse does not necessa-
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ployee is a policy maker;57 (4) whether the employee tries to com-
municate to the public; 58 and (5) whether people outside the work-
place debate the subject of the speech.59
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the confu-
sion among the circuits and clarify the definition of "public con-
cern" in Rankin v McPherson."0 The Court, however, merely as-
serted that McPherson's comment to her co-worker "plainly dealt
with a matter of public concern" because "[i]t came on the heels of
a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of heightened
public attention: an attempt on the life of the President."61 Con-
trary to the Court's suggestion, "heightened public attention"
should not determine whether speech deserves First Amendment
protection. In a case that preceded Rankin, the Seventh Circuit
argued convincingly that "public interest" is not that same as
"public concern":
In assessing whether the speech touches upon a matter of
public concern, it is important not to equate the public's curi-
osity about a matter with a matter having societal ramifica-
tions. People may be interested in any number of aspects of
the lives of public officials and employees, but that does not
mean that such matters have societal ramifications. Con-
versely, the public may be apathetic about certain matters of
public concern, but the unpopularity of the issue surely does
not mean that a voice crying out in the wilderness is entitled
to less protection than a voice with a large receptive
audience.62
rily destroy their protection under the First Amendment, but it is part of the context of the
communication to be considered in determining whether the speech addressed a matter of
public concern.").
57 See Gonzales v Benavides, 774 F2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir 1985) ("senior government
employees who exercise broad discretionary authority may be able to 'make or break' the
programs and policies of elected officials," so they should not be allowed to speak as freely
as those who do not make policy).
58 See Gomez v Texas Dept. of Mental Health, 794 F2d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir 1986) (be-
cause an employee "was not seeking to alert the public to any actual or potential wrongdo-
ing or breach of the public trust by the administrators of the State Center," his communica-
tion was not a matter of public concern).
" See id at 1021.
60 483 US 378, 107 S Ct 2891 (1987).
61 107 S Ct at 2898 (footnote omitted).
42 Egger v Phillips, 710 F2d 292, 316-17 (7th Cir 1983).
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Like the Seventh Circuit, the Rankin dissent63 and some commen-
tators64 have questioned Rankin's use of "public interest."6 5
The great differences among the circuits and the failure of the
Supreme Court to define "public concern" is problematic. Rather
than mitigating the harms of indeterminacy resulting from Picker-
ing balancing, the public concern threshold only adds to the
indeterminacy.
C. Speech Unrelated to Employment
Even if an adequate definition of "public concern" could be
derived, the public concern threshold should be abandoned be-
cause it denies the full protection of the First Amendment to pub-
lic employees when their speech is unrelated to the employment.
The Fourth Circuit uncovered this shortcoming in Berger v Bat-
taglia.6 6 Berger, a Baltimore police officer, performed in blackface
during his off-duty hours. He never identified himself as a police-
man, but the entertainment press sometimes did. When an adver-
tisement for a show raised protests from the black community, the
police department ordered Berger to stop performing. Berger sued
to challenge the order. The circuit court distinguished this case,
involving a policeman's artistic expression, from the "paradigmatic
Pickering pattern" because "the employee speech was not criticism
of or disagreement with governmental operations, and the govern-
mental interest assertedly threatened by the speech was not inter-
nal employment relationships and operations. '6 7
Although the officer's artistic expression was far removed from
his employment, Connick would allow the employer to restrict the
speech because it was not "on a matter of public concern." 68 To
63 Rankin, 107 S Ct at 2904 (Scalia dissenting).
"' See, for example, Note, Rankin v. McPherson: The Court Handcuffs Public Employ-
ers, 19 Pac L J 1543, 1560 (1988).
11 The Sixth Circuit's analysis of "public concern," however, seems very close to a
"public interest" standard. In Rowland v Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F2d 444 (6th
Cir 1984), a public schoolteacher was fired after admitting that she was a bisexual. To show
that the speech was of interest only to Rowland, the court stated that no evidence had been
presented showing that the community was concerned with the bisexuality of school person-
nel and that Rowland had attempted to keep the communications confidential. Id at 449.
6 779 F2d 992 (4th Cir 1985).
67 Id at 997.
6 The definition of public concern given in Connick seems broad: "relating to any mat-
ter of political, social, or other concern to the community." Connick 461 US at 146. As
applied in Connick, however, the definition was very narrow. As discussed at note 24, only
one of the questions asked by Myers-whether the assistant district attorneys faced official
political pressure-was deemed "of public concern." Id at 149. Questions dealing with the
district attorney's transfer policy, the confidence of workers in superiors, employee griev-
[57:249
Beyond "Public Concern"
avoid this incongruous result, the Fourth Circuit turned Connick
on its head:
[T]he "public concern" or "community interest" inquiry is
better designed-and more concerned-to identify a narrow
spectrum of employee speech that is not entitled even to qual-
ified protection than it is to set outer limits on all that is. The
principle that emerges is that all public employee speech that
by content is within the general protection of the first amend-
ment is entitled to at least qualified protection against public
employer chilling action except that which, realistically
viewed, is of purely "personal concern" to the em-
ployee-most typically, a private, personnel grievance.6 9
This interpretation suggests that Connick's formulation of the
public concern threshold requirement allows the state to limit
speech normally protected by the First Amendment, even when
the speech is only distantly connected with the employment. 0 In
other words, the public concern threshold ensures that the public
employee will never have the full protection of the First
Amendment.
In Flanagan v Munger,"1 a case "analytically indistinguish-
able" from Berger, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the public concern
threshold as "irrelevant" to public employee speech made "off the
job and unrelated to any internal functioning of the department. '7 2
In Munger, several Colorado Springs police officers were part own-
ers of a video store that rented sexually explicit-but not legally
"obscene"-films. After receiving an anonymous complaint, the po-
lice chief asked the officers to remove the films from their store
(they did) and informed them that he would issue a reprimand for
violating department regulations. 3
The circuit court held that the public concern threshold only
applies to speech made "at work or related to work. '74 Where, as
in this case, the speech was made away from the workplace on a
subject unrelated to the employment, the court found it "nearly
ance procedures, and office morale were not of public concern.
Berger, 779 F2d at 998 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
10 But the Berger court's solution is largely ineffectual, because it substitutes a notion
of "personal concern" for the notion of "public concern." It seems unlikely that "personal
concern" will be any easier to determine than "public concern."
71 890 F2d 1557 (10th Cir 1989).
72 Id at 1564-65.
73 Id at 1560-61.
714 Id at 1562.
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impossible to logically apply the public concern test."75 According
to the Munger court, the test was not intended to apply to speech
unrelated to the employment, where the person is not speaking as
an employee. 76
Up to this point, the Munger court was undoubtedly correct.
Connick was never intended to apply to such speech,"7 but
Rankin's extension of Connick shows that application of the public
concern test in the Berger/Munger context is plausible. The Mun-
ger court, however, created a troublesome new threshold for speech
"unrelated" to employment-whether the speech was "protected
expression."78 According to the court, if the speech were protected
expression, as in Munger itself, then it should be subjected to
Pickering balancing. In Munger, the police officers prevailed under
the balancing because their speech had not disrupted the efficiency
of the police department. 9 Had their speech been "unprotected
expression," the reprimands would have been upheld. Munger per-
petuates the flaws of Connick and Berger: unlike Pickering, it pro-
vides public employees only qualified First Amendment protection
in the form of balancing, even when their speech is unrelated to
their employment.
III. THE PROPOSED THRESHOLD TEST
The Supreme Court has correctly determined that speech by
public employees should be subjected to a unique First Amend-
ment standard because public employees are in a unique position
to impair government operations. In Munger, the Tenth Circuit at-
tempted to overcome the difficulties of the current Pickering/Con-
nick test, but, as this Comment suggests, it did not solve all the
problems. To address these concerns, this Comment proposes a
new threshold test for First Amendment analysis of public em-
ployee speech.
75 Id.
76 Id at 1564.
17 Dissenting in Connick, Justice Brennan assumed that the public concern threshold
did not apply to speech like that in Berger and Munger. "When public employees engage in
expression unrelated to their employment while away from the workplace, their First
Amendment rights are, of course, no different than those of the general public." Connick,
461 US at 157 (Brennan dissenting).
78 Munger, 890 F2d at 1564.
79 Id at 1565.
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A. Burdens of Proof
Before introducing the new threshold test, it is necessary to
consider the preliminary matter of the assignment of burdens of
proof. When a public employee raises a First Amendment chal-
lenge to an employment decision, the employee has traditionally
borne and should bear the burden of proving causation (i.e., "the
employer fired me because of my speech")., 0 This burden is not
excessive: to allow an employee to prevail without proving grounds
for recovery would encourage employees to bring baseless suits in
the hope that the government would fail to sustain its burden of
proof.
Requiring proof of causation ensures that the employer acted
in response to the employee's speech. The state may contest causa-
tion, arguing that the speech did not precipitate the sanction." An
employer may have many reasons for terminating or disciplining
an employee, and the employee can sustain a First Amendment
claim only if the employer acted primarily to suppress the em-
ployee's speech. This standard prevents employees who were about
to be fired from avoiding legitimate employment-related discipline
by engaging in protected speech.2
In addition to proof of causation, the Court has required the
employee to demonstrate that his conduct was constitutionally
protected. 3 In most cases, this burden would require little more
than proof of what was said. But in some First Amendment con-
texts, it could create odd allocations of proof. For example, must
an employee accused of libelous speech prove the truth of the
speech or absence of malice? If so, then the normal First Amend-
ment burdens would be inverted, because the government official is
normally required to show falsity or malice. A better solution
80 This situation might be analogized to race and gender discrimination cases, where
the plaintiff must show that the state action was directed at the plaintiff's race or gender. In
the context of Title VII, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792, 802 (1973); and
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248 (1981).
81 See Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 287; Caffas v Bd. of School Directors, 23 Pa Commw
578, 353 A2d 898, 899 (1976) (teacher dismissed because of cruelty to students, not because
speech was critical of the school's administration).
82 See Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 286:
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employment question resolved
against him because of constitutionally protected conduct. But that same candidate
ought not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from assess-
ing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that
record, simply because the protected conduct makes the employer more certain of the
correctness of his decision.
83 Id at 287.
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would allow "unprotectedness" as a justification for government
action. The government could justifiably fire or discipline an em-
ployee because the employee engaged in speech that would not
merit First Amendment protection, even if made by an ordinary
citizen. The Court in Pickering, for example, would have denied
the teacher's First Amendment claim had his speech been libelous.
But, as in Pickering, the government should have the burden of
proving that the speech would ordinarily lack protection. 4
B. The Proposed Threshold Test
The premise of this proposed threshold test is that before an
individual's speech is subjected to the balancing of interests for
public employees, the speech should be sufficiently related to the
employment so that the individual can be said to be speaking as a
public employee rather than as an ordinary citizen. The proposed
threshold test is:
Public employee speech is immune from employment-based
sanctions by the state if it: (1) is made away from the work-
place; and (2) concerns matters unrelated to workplace per-
sonnel or policies or unrelated to political issues directly af-
fecting the employee's working relationships.
The key concept in the proposed test is "relatedness": if
speech is sufficiently related to the employment, the individual
speaks as an employee; otherwise, the individual speaks as a citi-
zen. The sufficiency of the relation between the speech and em-
ployment is measured by two criteria: location and content. These
two criteria reflect the underlying rationale for the proposed
threshold: namely, that an individual who becomes a public em-
ployee does not forfeit the constitutional rights he would otherwise
exercise as a citizen, but that those rights may be altered by the
existence of the employment relationship. The proposed threshold
suggests, therefore, that the effect of the employment relationship
extends only to speech which is "related" by location or content to
the employment.
Pickering assumes that if an employee's speech disrupts gov-
ernment efficiency, the employment relationship justifies stricter-
than-usual First Amendment standards (i.e., a balancing of inter-
ests); if speech does not disrupt government efficiency, the employ-
"' The Court held that Pickering's speech should be protected "absent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made." Pickering, 391 US at 574. The implication is that
the government employer would have the burden of proof.
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ment relationship is irrelevant and the employee's speech is sub-
ject to the same First Amendment standards as speech by an
ordinary citizen. 5 But Pickering's effects-based test was itself
problematic: because employees c"ould not confidently predict the
effects of their speech, they did not know in advance whether their
speech would be protected by ordinary First Amendment stan-
dards or the more restrictive balancing of interests.86 A primary
advantage of the proposed threshold test is its "reckonability." It
allows employees to evaluate ex ante whether their speech is pro-
tected by broad or narrow First Amendment standards.
Although this Comment accepts Pickering's notion that public
employees may be subjected to stricter standards than ordinary
citizens because of their potential for disruption, it argues that dis-
ruption need not be considered at this threshold stage. By consid-
ering disruption, Pickering ensured that only disruptive speech
would be subjected to the restrictive balancing of interests. That
goal is also achieved under the proposed formulation because the
employer must prove the existence of disruption under the balanc-
ing of interests, discussed in the following section, in order to re-
strict the employee's speech. Nondisruptive speech, therefore, will
be protected whether it is immunized by a threshold test or by the
balancing of interests itself.
The proposed threshold accepts the fact that speech made
away from the workplace on subjects unrelated to employment
may be disruptive. If, for example, an off-duty police officer
marches in an anti-abortion rally, some of the officer's coworkers
and members of the community might be disturbed by the officer's
expression, and their reaction could disrupt government opera-
tions. But the speech should be protected despite the disruption.
The goal of the threshold determination is to select cases in which
the relationship of the speech to the employment is so attenuated
that a court could not justly apply the restrictive balancing of in-
terests even though the speech ultimately disrupts government
efficiency.
The proposed threshold steers a middle course between two
extremes: the traditional right/privilege distinction and ordinary
First Amendment standards. The right/privilege distinction allows
an employee's First Amendment rights to be wholly abridged at
the discretion of the employer. 87 Ordinary First Amendment stan-
Pickering, 391 US at 569-73.
86 See Recent Decisions, 35 Brooklyn L Rev at 275 (cited in note 36).
17 See text and notes 7, 10.
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dards allow abridgment only in exceptional cases. The proposed
threshold permits the application of a more restrictive First
Amendment standard (i.e., the balancing of interests), but only
when the speech is related to the employment.
When speech is unrelated to the employment, therefore,
courts should grant public employees a "safe harbor" from the re-
strictive First Amendment standards governing their employment-
related speech. If the court determines that an individual has spo-
ken as an employee, the court should apply the unique First
Amendment standards for employee speech discussed in the fol-
lowing section. If the individual speaks as a citizen, the court
should rule in favor of the public employee because the employee
has already proven causation and the government has failed to
prove unprotectedness.
The proposed threshold test immunizes a narrow range of
public employee free speech cases. Pickering is such a case.8
Under the proposed test, the teacher would have been absolutely
protected from employment-based sanctions because his speech
did not violate First Amendment libel standards (i.e., it was pro-
tected speech under the initial burden of proof) and he spoke (1)
away from the workplace (in a letter to the local newspaper) and
(2) on a matter not directly affecting his working relationships (the
school board's handling of revenue proposals and its allocation of
funds).
IV. BEYOND THE THRESHOLD: THE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Any attempt by the state to restrict employment-related
speech creates a tension between the interests of the employee in
speaking freely and the interests of the government in operating
efficiently. The Supreme Court has chosen to resolve that tension
by balancing the interests in "public concern cases" on a case-by-
case basis. In a world with perfect information and perfect infor-
mation processors, this balancing test would be ideal. The courts
would decide each case correctly because they could assess the pre-
cise weight of the competing interests. But we do not live in that
world, and any time a court is asked to assign "weights" or "val-
ues" to .abstract notions like "disruption" and "free speech," the
88 Other cases that would be immunized by the proposed threshold include Berger v
Battaglia, 779 F2d 992 (4th Cir 1985), discussed in text at notes 66-70; and Flanagan v
Munger, 890 F2d 1557 (10th Cir 1989), discussed in text at notes 71-79.
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outcome will be indeterminate and the expenditure of judicial re-
sources high.
This Comment proposes evaluating the free speech rights of
public employees not by balancing the competing interests once a
case has arisen, but by applying two objective inquiries that them-
selves capture the relevant individual and public values. First, the
court should ask: Can the state prove that the employee's speech
actually caused disruption of government efficiency? If it cannot, it
may not sanction the employee. If the state can prove actual dis-
ruption, then it may sanction the employee unless the employee
can demonstrate that the speech was more valuable to the public
than the disruption it caused. This value is proved not by entering
evidence of the cost of the disruption and the value of the speech,
but by answering the court's second question: Does the speech
"bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public
trust on the part of [a government official]"? 89
This proposed analysis accounts for the interests of both the
state and the individual. The individual's interest in engaging in
speech unrelated to employment is preserved by the new, two-
pronged threshold test discussed in section III. In addition, the in-
dividual may engage in unlimited non disruptive employment-re-
lated speech, but faces the threat of employment-related sanctions
if he engages in disruptive, employment-related speech.
Finally, the proposed test permits a government employee to
engage in disruptive, employment-related speech that reveals
wrongdoing or a breach of public trust. The state undoubtedly has
an interest in restricting disruptive speech in order to promote the
efficient and effective provision of government services, but when
disruption is the result of an employee revealing wrongdoing or a
breach of public trust, the state's interest in restricting such
speech ceases. Its interest in the efficient and effective provision of
government services is furthered when wrongdoing and breaches of
public trust are prevented or corrected.
A. Employer Proves Disruption
Pickering would have required employers attempting to justify
their discharge or discipline of an employee to prove that the em-
ployee's speech was actually disruptive. But actual disruption is
"g Connick, 461 US at 148. Connick used this formulation as one of its definitions of
"public concern." Although the concept of "public concern" is generally troublesome, this
particular aspect is quite useful.
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very difficult to prove. Perhaps to lighten the burden of proof, the
Connick Court accorded the employer, District Attorney Connick,
a great deal of deference. Although the lower courts had found no
proof that Myer's questionnaire caused any actual disruption, Con-
nick testified that working relationships had been disturbed. The
Court concluded:
When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling
public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the em-
ployer's judgment is appropriate. Furthermore, we do not see
the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the
extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of
working relationships is manifest before taking action. We
caution that a stronger showing may be necessary if the em-
ployee's speech more substantially involved matters of public
concern.
90
The dissent in Connick objected to the majority's deference to
the employer's judgment and stated that the majority had "misap-
plie[d] the Pickering test." The dissent pointed out that the ma-
jority had contradicted "previous authorities" by holding "that a
public employer's mere apprehension that speech will be disruptive
justifies suppression of that speech when all the objective evidence
suggests that these fears are essentially unfounded."'"
As the dissent correctly stated, Pickering implicitly required a
showing of actual harm. The Pickering Court noted: "[The state-
ments] are neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any way
either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily du-
ties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular opera-
tion of the schools generally. '9 2 Many of Pickering's progeny re-
quired the employer to show actual harm.93
It makes sense to place the burden of proof on the employer
once the employee has shown causation. Imagine a case where
neither the employer nor the employee can carry an initial burden
90 Connick, 461 US at 151-52 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
91 Id at 166 (Brennan dissenting).
92 391 US at 572-73 (footnote omitted).
93 See Tygrett v Washington, 543 F2d 840, 848 (DC Cir 1974) ("The crucial question
for decision was whether appellant's remarks, in the particular circumstances surrounding
them, actually impinged upon qualities making for an effective police force in such a man-
ner as to imperil its efficiency.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); and James v Bd. of
Education, 461 F2d 566, 571 (2d Cir 1972) ("Any limitation on the exercise of constitutional
rights can be justified only by a conclusion, based on reasonable inferences flowing from
concrete facts and not abstractions, that the interests of discipline or sound education are
materially and substantially jeopardized .... ).
[57:249
Beyond "Public Concern"
of proof (i.e., the employer can't show disruption and the employee
can't show public value). In this case, the public employee should
prevail because public employers should be required to justify em-
ployment-related sanctions that serve to restrict free speech. The
employer, therefore, should have the initial burden of proof. But
the burden of proving actual disruption is onerous, at least in part
because of the indeterminacy of "disruption." That burden can be
lightened by objectifying the test for disruption.
Objective criteria for disruption can be found in Pickering it-
self. The Court listed four "general lines along which an analysis of
the controlling interests should run. ' '94 Of the four, three dealt
with the disruptive effect of the speech on the efficiency of the gov-
ernment: (1) whether the statements were directed at any person
with whom the appellant would normally be in contact in the
course of daily work;95 (2) whether the speaker or the speaker's co-
workers were unable to perform their daily duties or whether the
agency was unable to maintain regular operations;96 and (3)
whether the harmful impact of the speech on the public would be
difficult for the government to counter.9 7 Under the proposed anal-
ysis, if the employer can show that the speech at issue fits any one
of the three criteria, the speech should be presumed to be
disruptive.
1. Were the statements directed at any person with whom
the appellant would normally be in contact in the course of daily
work?
Although it may appear harsh to deem disruptive any speech
"directed at" people with whom an employee would normally be in
contact, the criterion implicitly requires that the speech actually
concern the other person. In Rankin, therefore, an employee's
statement about President Reagan was not "directed at" either co-
worker who heard the statement because the speaker was not criti-
cizing the coworkers. Nevertheless, many types of speech typically
engaged in by public employees would satisfy the "directed at" re-
quirement. In Givhan v Western Line Consolidated School Dis-
trict, for example, a school teacher confronted the principal with
"criticism of the policies and practices of the school district, espe-
94 391 US at 569.
95 Id at 569-70.
96 Id at 572-73.
97 Id at 572.
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cially the school to which she was assigned to teach."' 8 Such
speech would be considered disruptive under the proposed test be-
cause it concerned (was "directed at") the principal.99
This criterion is especially apt to identify employee criticism
of a supervisor as disruptive. The Pickering Court was concerned
about the employer's ability to maintain discipline and harmony in
the workplace. By adversely affecting close working relationships,
speech may lead to less efficient government. The effect of speech
on close working relationships might also impair government ser-
vices where "personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their
proper functioning." 100 The Court also hypothesized that other sit-
uations may involve the "need for confidentiality" or "personal
and intimate" relationships to a degree that would justify govern-
ment restrictions on speech, even if the speech is true.101
2. Were the speaker or his coworkers unable to perform their
daily duties, or was the agency unable to maintain regular
operations?
This criterion addresses speech that directly affects the work-
place. In Connick, for example,
the questionnaire was prepared and distributed at the office;
the manner of distribution required not only Myers to leave
her work but others to do the same in order that the question-
naire be completed. Although some latitude in when official
work is performed is to be allowed when professional employ-
ees are involved, and Myers did not violate announced office
policy, the fact that Myers, unlike Pickering, exercised her
rights to speech at the office supports Connick's fears that the
functioning of his office was endangered. 02
The disruption in Connick seemed rather minimal, but it was
disruption nonetheless. At this point in the inquiry, a court is not
establishing the limits of First Amendment protection. Rather, it is
discerning potential grounds for governmental concern. Although
os 439 US 410, 413 (1979) (quoting the district court).
Although the value of this speech may be high, it cannot be denied that such speech
is disruptive to working relationships, and at this stage of the analysis, disruption is all that
is at issue. The speech in Givhan would ultimately be protected under the proposed analysis
because the value of the speech (measured by the fact that it reveals a breach of public
trust) outweighs the disruption that the speech causes.
"0 Pickering, 391 US at 570.
101 Id at 570 n 3.
"0I Connick, 461 US at 153 (footnotes omitted).
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an employer may not be entirely reasonable in dismissing an em-
ployee for minor disruptions, the Court has never held that the
First Amendment protects public employees from unreasonable
employment decisions per se. The employee is only protected when
his interest in speaking outweighs the government's interest in re-
stricting speech.
3. Would it be difficult for the government to counter the
harmful impact of the speech on the public?
This criterion deals with the efficiency concerns of government
(albeit less obviously), because most, if not all, government agen-
cies require public support to fulfill their functions. If an em-
ployee's speech injures the public's perception of the agency, the
agency may be unable to provide its services efficiently. The ideal
remedy for harmful public speech is counterspeech: the harm to
the government can be eliminated if the government's view of the
matter could be easily disseminated.
But, where counterspeech is unavailable, the agency's interests
might be irreparably injured. In Allen v Scribner, for example, a
local supervisor on a larvae detection project told the media that
the project's management "did not have a 'handle'" on the infesta-
tion of Mediterranean fruit flies.103 Such speech might be difficult
to counter in the media, and if it is, the project would lose public
support. In short, the speech would be disruptive.
The three objective criteria listed above represent the full "ef-
ficiency" interests of a government employer; the employer has no
interest in restricting speech that does not meet one of these three
broad criteria, and thus every employer must prove that the case
fits within one of the criteria to justify a claim of disruption. In
Pickering, the school board was unable to show that the letter ful-
filled any of the criteria, and so the employee prevailed. In Con-
nick, the employer showed that the speech was directed at him and
that the speech prevented both the employee and her coworkers
from performing their daily duties.""
103 812 F2d 426, 428 (9th Cir 1987).
104 The Court in Connick seemed to rely more on the employer's fear of disruption than
on actual disruption, finding that "there is no demonstration here that the questionnaire
impeded Myer's ability to perform her responsibilities." 461 US at 151. But the quotation
above (see text at note 102) indicates that some disruption took place. Under the objective
criteria, therefore, the employer would be justified in acting.
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Finally, the constable in Rankin would not be able to show
disruption under any of these criteria:
The Constable was evidently not afraid that McPherson had
disturbed or interrupted other employees-he did not inquire
to whom the respondent had made the remark and testified
that he "was not concerned who she had made it to . .. " In
fact, Constable Rankin testified that the possibility of inter-
ference with the functions of the Constable's office had not
been a consideration .... 105
Although one might argue that the statement in Rankin prevented
the coworker from accomplishing his daily duties, that was not the
basis for McPherson's termination. Moreover, the coworker had to
eavesdrop on a private conversation just to hear McPherson's
speech. It was the coworker's own actions that prevented him from
accomplishing his daily duties. A better argument would be that
the speech took McPherson away from her own work. If this had
been the basis for the termination, the government would have
prevailed under the proposed analysis. Although employers often
allow private conversations during working hours, the First
Amendment should not require them to. An employee who de-
tracts from work by engaging in personal conversations, therefore,
does so at his own risk. In this situation, the employer fires the
employee not because the employer was trying to suppress speech
but because the employee was not doing his job.
The criteria for disruption are reasonable and prudent. They
are reasonable because speech that fits any of the three criteria will
almost always have an actual disruptive effect, even if the effect is
small or difficult to prove empirically. The criteria are prudent be-
cause the presumptions prevent the burden of proving "disrup-
tion" from falling too heavily on the employer.
B. Employee Proves Value of Speech
According to Pickering and its progeny, disruptive speech
merits First Amendment protection from employment-based sanc-
tions only if its value exceeds the cost of the disruption it causes.
As with the cost of disruption, the actual value of speech is impos-
sible to determine. The next best solution, therefore, is an objec-
tive rule that approximates the expected balance of interests. An
objective rule carries the additional advantages of providing em-
115 Rankin, 107 S Ct at 2899 (emphasis in original).
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ployees well-defined limits to their free speech rights and enabling
courts to decide cases more easily and quickly. The proposed stan-
dard for deciding whether the speech's value exceeds the cost of
disruption is simple: Does the speech "bring to light actual or po-
tential wrongdoing or breach of the public trust on the part of [a
government official] "1?106
This inquiry is rooted in the dual roles that the individual and
the state play in the public employment area. It has already been
shown how the proposed threshold test provides protection for the
public employee speaking as a citizen about matters unrelated to
the employment. The proposed objective measurement of the value
of a public employee's speech is designed to parallel and protect
the public employee's interest in speaking as a citizen about work-
related matters.
Given the government's interest in the efficient provision of
services, there is little employment-related, disruptive speech that
should, as a policy matter, be protected from the control of the
government as employer. By requiring that speech "bring to light
actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of the public trust"
before overriding proof of disruption, the proposed standard pro-
tects important employee speech without compromising govern-
ment interests. The proposed standard addresses the real concern,
indeed the essential justification for giving First Amendment pro-
tection to public employees at all; namely, attempts by the state,
acting as employer, to suppress public employees from speaking as
citizens.
When an employee reveals wrongdoing or a breach of public
trust, disruption is inevitable. The speech will often be directed at
the employer, and will, by definition, be impossible for the em-
ployer to counter. But public employees are precisely "the mem-
bers of the community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions"'10 about government corruption and ineptitude. If the
employee can prove, therefore, that the speech reveals wrongdoing
or a breach of public trust, the speech should be protected by the
First Amendment.
This objective measurement of value does not depend on
whether the speech actually reaches the public. Justice Brennan, in
his dissent in Connick, observed that "[t]he First Amendment af-
fords special protection to speech that may inform public debate
about how our society is to be governed-regardless of whether it
106 Connick, 461 US at 148.
107 Pickering, 391 US at 572.
1990]
The University of Chicago Law Review
actually becomes the subject of a public controversy. "108 Thus,
when an employee speaks on a matter that involves a breach of
public trust, his speech should be protected, even if the speech
never actually reaches the public.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court devised Pickering balancing, it did
not "deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down
a general standard against which all [statements by public employ-
ees] may be judged."'10 9 As the Court encountered more cases in-
volving the free speech rights of public employees, it became more
comfortable with the notion of general standards and adopted the
public concern threshold test. The experience of the courts reveals
that the public concern threshold is an indeterminate and unjust
First Amendment standard for public employee speech. This Com-
ment proposes a change.
The change features a new threshold test that characterizes
speech based on its relationship to employment. If a public em-
ployee's speech is "unrelated" to his employment, the speech
should be evaluated under the same First Amendment standards
applicable to similar speech made by ordinary citizens. Conversely,
if the employee's speech is "related" to his employment, the
speech should be evaluated under First Amendment standards
that protect the government's interest in providing its services effi-
ciently. Currently those standards are embodied in Pickering's bal-
ancing of interests, but this Comment proposes objective rules that
approximate the results of balancing without the indeterminacy
and excessive expenditure of judicial resources inherent in
balancing.
The risk of framing objective rules such as those proposed
here is that cases may push the limits of those rules, making them
seem unfair or nonsensical. One of the costs of determinacy is that
cases will not always receive the tailor-made analysis available
under a "totality of the circumstances" approach. Under the pro-
posed threshold test, for example, an employee might reveal a
breach of public trust in a particularly disruptive manner. If that
occurred, a court might consider a reasonability limitation on the
employee's defense-that publication of the speech must be done
in a reasonable manner if it is to be protected.
Connick, 461 US at 160.
"' Pickering, 391 US at 569.
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Undoubtedly such accommodations to the vagaries of em-
ployer/employee relations will be required. But the search for
perfection should not obscure the risk that general rules often do
more harm than good. The proposed test offers a set of objective
rules under which the outcomes of cases will closely approximate
the outcomes under an equitable balancing of interests.

